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NOTES
THE "OPEN DOOR" LAWS: AN APPRAISAL
OF OPEN MEETING LEGISLATION IN INDIANA
INTRODUCTION
An increasingly assertive conviction that the public's business
should be conducted in public has produced a legion of state legisla-
tion attempting to establish the public's right to attend government
meetings.' In an early draft of Indiana's Open Door Law, proponents
for open meetings expressed that conviction with unusual force:
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to
the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating
1. Every state now has some form of open meeting legislation. ALA. CODE §
13-5-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.310-.312 (Supp. 1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § §
38-341 to -431.09 (Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2801 to -2807 (1979 Replacement
Vol.); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11120-31 (Supp. 1979) and f§ 54950-61 (Supp. 1979); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 29-9-101 (Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 1-21 to -21A (Supp. 1979);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10001 to 10005 (Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286,011 (Supp.
1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-3301 to -3303 (Supp. 1979); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 92-1 to -13
(1976 Replacement Vol.); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-2340 to -2347 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 102, §§ 41-46 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE §§ 5-14-1.5-1 to -7 (Supp. 1979);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.1 to 28A.8 (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4317 to -4320
(1977 and Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.805-.991 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. § 42.5 to
.8 (Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 §§ 402-06 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1979);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 14 (1978 Replacement Vol.); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 11A
(1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.261-273 (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705
(1977); MISS. CODE §§ 25-41-1 to -15 (Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 610.010-.030 (1979);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 82-3401 to -3406 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-1408 to
-1414 (1976 Reissue Vol.); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 241.010 to .040 (1973); N.H. STAT. ANN. §§
91A:1 to A:8 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:4-7 to -21 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
10-15-1 to -4 (Supp. 1979); N.Y. PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW §§ 95 to 106 (Supp. 1979); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.1 to 318.7 (1978 Replacement Vol.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19
(1960); OHIO REV. § 121.22 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 301-14 (Supp. 1979); GEN.
LAWS R.I. §42-46-1 to -10 (1977 Reenactment Vol.), as amended (Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-20 to -20.4 (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 1-25-1 to -5 (1974); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 8-4402 to -4406 (Supp. 1979); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 6252-17 (Supp.
1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 52-4-1 to -9 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 §§ 312-14
(Supp. 1979); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-340 to -346.1 (1979 Replacement Vol.); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 42.30.010-.920 (1974) as amended (Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE §§ 6-9A-1 to -7
(1979 Replacement Vol.); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.81 to .98 (Supp. 1979); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9-11-101 to -107 (1977). Open records acts, another branch of right-to-know legisla-
tion, are excluded from the scope of this note.
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authority, do not give their public servants the right to
decide what is good for the people to know and what is
not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining
fully informed so that they may retain control over the
public agencies they have created to serve them.2
Since 1953, with the pioneering passage of Indiana's Hughes Anti-
Secrecy Act and California's Brown Act, all states have adopted
some form of open meeting requirements.3 Much of the early legisla-
tion, however, produced enough ambiguous verbiage, evasive lip ser-
vice and confusion to require a second stage of remedial legislation
during the past decade.'
In 1977 and again in 1979, Indiana rewrote and greatly ex-
panded its 1953 anti-secrecy act to require open meetings.' The
changes brought the state in line with progressive patterns and
principles developed since the 1950s in California, Florida, Michigan,
Tennessee and Washington.' The new "Open Door" legislation7 was
2. H. 1237, 99th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1976). Nearly identical language
appears in the Washington statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.010 (1974).
3. See Comment, Open Meeting Laws: An Analysis and Proposal, 45 MIss.
L.J. 1151, 1158 (1974). In 1959 there were 20 states with open meeting laws. In 1962
there were 28. By 1974, there were 46. Today there are 50. The code sections are cited
at note 1 supra. The four states passing open meeting laws since 1974 are New York,
Rhode Island, Mississippi and West Virginia.
4. See Murtha, Most 'Open Meeting' Laws Found to be Ineffective, Editor
and Publisher, Aug. 24, 1974, at 11. Dr. John Adams of the University of North
Carolina noted in a report published by the University of Missouri and noted in Editor
and Publisher that in 1974 the status of state law in this area was blurred by an im-
pressive amount of activity in legislatures, resulting in frequent and extensive change.
That process of amendment and modification has continued through the end of the
decade.
5. IND. CODE §§ 5-14-1.5-1 to -7 (1977). The pre-1977 act was IND. CODE
5-14-1-4 and 5-14-1-5 (1953):
Except as may now or hereafter be otherwise specifically provided
by law, all public proceedings shall be open to any citizen of this state,
and every citizen shall, insofar as physical facilities permit, be permitted
to observe such proceedings. Nothing in this act contained shall be con-
strued to modify or repeal any existing law with regard to public records
which, by law, are declared to be confidential. Nor shall anything in this
act be construed to modify or repeal any existing law, rule or regulation,
with regard to the holding of executive sessions by any administrative
body or agency. Provided, however, that no administrative body or agen-
cy shall, under the guise of holding an executive session, conduct public
proceedings in such a manner as to defeat the declared policy of this act
as set forth in section 1 hereof.
6. Cited at note 1 supra. Indiana's legislative drafters based the statute
largely on statutes enacted in California and Washington. Interview with Richard
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heavily debated and amended in an effort to strike a practical
balance among such nebulous factors as the public's right to know,
the individual's expectation of privacy, governmental efficiency and
the role of the press in a democracy.'
Because the press and organized citizens' groups are ever
urging greater public access to governmental meetings, it is likely
that local government, state courts and the legislature will continue
to be confronted by aggressive efforts to enforce and liberally con-
strue the open meetings law.' Consequently, it is worthwhile to con-
sider Indiana's approach to open meetings and to explore the
statutory policy decisions made to accommodate the conflicting con-
siderations.
THE OPEN MEETING PRINCIPLE
Abraham Lincoln's call at Gettysburg for a government by the
people was a call flavored more by hopeful prophecy and rhetoric
than by reality. Lincoln knew, as any competent common-law lawyer
would know, that the folks back home in the Midwest not only did
not govern directly, but lacked even a common-law right to attend
government meetings. 0 America's heritage of English law does not
include open government.
The English Parliament debated in private. Members of the
House of Commons claimed a right to secrecy as a safeguard from
Cardwell, General Counsel for The Hoosier State Press Association, in Indianapolis
(Sept. 24, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Cardwell Interview, Sept. 24, 1979]. Cardwell
prepared the model statute used by Indiana.
7. Indiana legislators voted to call the act "The Open Door Law." JOURNAL
OF THE SENATE, 100th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1977) at 118. Other states have used
popular names like Florida's "Sunshine Law."
8. The act was amended at every opportunity except one during the 1977
session of the Indiana General Assembly. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 100th Gen.
Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1977) at 1, 106 and 118; JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, 100th Gen.
Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1977) at 682, 720, 721 and 744.
9. More than a dozen lawsuits have been filed in Indiana since the act was
passed, about half of the cases in 1979. The first violation of the act resulting in a hear-
ing occurred the morning the act became effective on Sept. 1, 1977, when an Alcoholic
Beverage Board conducted an executive session without notice. Interview with Richard
Cardwell, General Counsel for The Hoosier State Press Association, in Indianapolis
(Oct. 25, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Cardwell Interview, Oct. 25, 1979].
10. For a general discussion of the history of public access to governmental
meetings, see H. CROSS. THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953); F. THAYER, LEGAL CON-
TROL OF THE PRESS (4th ed. 1962); A. WIGGINS. FREEDOM OR SECRECY (1956); Note, Open
Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know," 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199
(1962).
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intimidation and on grounds of convenience and protection from the
pressures of critical public opinion." It was not until 1908 that
England adopted an open meetings act. 12 That statute, enacted in
response to an English court ruling that the press and public had no
right to attend meetings of local authorities, was one of the first
open meeting laws passed by any legislature.'3 The English common-
law practice of private governmental meetings continued in the
United States after the Revolution. The Constitutional Convention
of 1787 conducted its sessions in secrecy, and debate during the
early years of the Senate were in closed session."
The tone, the spirit and the cadence of Lincoln's Gettysburg
speech, however, are echoes of the Constitution, not of the dusty
doctrines of common law. His government by the people is a con-
stitutional government. Advocates of open meetings have often and
hotly argued that the public's right to attend meetings is implicit in
the first two articles of the Constitution as well as the First Amend-
ment. 5 American courts, nevertheless, have never read the Con-
stitution so expansively.'" To the courts it is not obvious, as some
have argued, that freedom of the press implies the right to gather
news. No court has as yet been willing to extend constitutional
guarantees to include a right of access despite arguments that
government by the people means nothing unless the people have the
opportunity to observe and participate." And yet, Lincoln's ideal of
11. Note, 75 HARV. L. REV., supra note 10, at 1203.
12. Local Authorities (Admission of the Press to Meetings) Act, 8 Edw. 7, c.
43 (1908).
13. Alabama has been credited with being the first state to pass an open
meetings law. ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 393-94 (1959) (enacted 1915). Comment, 45 Miss.
L.J., supra note 3, at 1154 (1974).
14. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 xi, 15
(rev. ed. 1937).
15. Comment, 45 Miss. L.J., supra note 3, at 1159; Comment, Ambiguities in
Oregon's Open Meeting Legislation, 53 ORE. L. REV. 339, 341 (1974). For arguments
supporting a constitutional right of access, see Parks, The Open Government Princi-
ple: Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1
(1957); Note, Access to Official Infornation. A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND.
L.J. 209 (1952).
16. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727-28 (1973); but see Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 839-41 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
17. One commentator, however, suggests that under some circumstances the
secrecy of government meetings may in fact be protected by the constitutional rights
of free speech and assembly. See Hollow, Tennessee Sunshine, 42 TENN. L. REV. 527,
542 (1975), citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), and Miami Beach
v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
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popular government has not withered for lack of guardians among
common law and constitutional law makers.
During the past decade, the states and the federal government
have adopted or strengthened statutes aimed at making government
more open and directly accountable to the people. 8 In Indiana, for
example, legislators have drastically revised existing laws and in so
doing have stirred the embers of old common-law debates about who
should govern and how openly."' Indiana's open meetings law
reflects a number of policy decisions by the legislature that touch
sensitive areas of governmental decision making." The debate for
passage drew its strength from the national concern of the early
1970s about governmental abuse of power as well as from local
citizens and newspapers disturbed by closed meetings and pre-
meeting discussions, especially among school boards.'
Indiana's response was to reaffirm that the state and its
political subdivisions exist only to aid the business of the state's
citizens, and that deliberations and actions of public agencies are to
be conducted openly in order that the citizens may be fully informed.'
The legislation, rejected in 1976, amended and passed in 1977 and
amended again in 1979, was modified at almost every opportunity.23
Drafts of the bill involved heavy lobbying by organizations represent-
ing the press, schools, hospitals, and local government officials." The
final product resulted in a statute with wide ranging effects. It
18. E.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970); Legislative
Reorganization Act, 2 U.S.C. § 190a(b) (1970). For a general discussion of federal efforts
to open government meetings and information, see Hunter, Statutory and Judicial
Responses to the Problem of Access to Government Information, 79 DET. COLL. L. REV.
51 (1979).
19. IND. CODE §§ 5-14-1.5-1 to -7 (Supp. 1979).
20. "It was one of the most amended laws in the history of Indiana because it
involved an access policy for the state. People are fully in agreement with access as
long as they are not affected." Cardwell Interview, Sept. 24, 1979.
21. Impetus for the Indiana legislation came largely as a result of efforts by
Jack Howey and John Mitchell of Nixon Newspapers Inc. during the early 1970s.
Howey, then editor of the Peru Tribune, and Mitchell, then publisher of the Frankfort
Times and a former Indiana legislator, expressed frustration about their newspapers'
inability to cover secret school board meetings. That frustration was translated into
efforts by Cardwell and the state press association to draft legislation for the 1976 ses-
sion of the General Assembly.
22. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-1 (1977).
23. Supra note 8.
24. The lobby organizations most actively involved in the law's drafting and
adoption were the Hoosier State Press Association, the Indiana School Board Associa-
tion and the Indiana Hospital Association.
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severely restricts executive sessions,25 forbids use of a secret
ballot," requires 48-hour notice to news media, 7 and provides citizen
standing to seek injunctive relief2 " or have governmental decisions
declared void for violations of the act."
Since passage, the statute has spawned nearly a dozen court
cases, one of them reaching the Indiana Court of Appeals during the
summer of 1979.1 Areas of conflict have sprung largely from ques-
tions of exemptions, the use of executive sessions, notice re-
quirements and remedies. Because Indiana's legislative experience
did not occur in a provincial vacuum, but was heavily influenced by
the activities of other states and courts in this area of ad-
ministrative law, this note examines in some detail these four prin-
cipal areas of conflict in Indiana in light of legislative responses of
the various states to the open government concept.
COVERAGE
The Indiana Open Door Law applies to "all meetings of the
governing bodies of public agencies."81 Consequently, an analysis of
coverage involves three distinct inquiries. First, it must be deter-
mined whether there is, in fact, a meeting as defined by the statute,
that is, whether it is a "gathering of a majority ... for the purpose
of taking official action upon public business."82 Second, if it is a
meeting, then it must be determined whether the body conducting
the meeting is the governing body of a public agency as defined by
the statute. Finally, if it is a meeting of an appropriate governing
body, then it must be determined whether any exceptions exist per-
mitting the meeting to be closed.
Mee tings
Like California, Washington and a number of other states, In-
diana's act carefully defines crucial terms in an effort to avoid as
much ambiguity and confusion as possible." The pivotal terms in the
statute include "meeting," "public agency," "governing body," and
25. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-6 (Supp. 1979).
26. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-3(a) (Supp. 1979).
27. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-5 (Supp. 1979).
28. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-7(a) (Supp. 1979).
29. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-7(b) (Supp. 1979).
30. Blinn v. City of Marion, __ Ind. App. -, 390 N.E.2d 1066 (1979).
31. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-3(a) (Supp. 1979).
32. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(c) (Supp. 1979).
33. CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 11121-23 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.30.020
(1974).
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"official action." Each of these words are central to an understand-
ing of the law's reach, and ordinary dictionary definitions are not
much help. A meeting, under the act, means "a gathering of a ma-
jority of the governing body of a public agency for the purpose of
taking official action upon public business."' The act expressly ex-
cludes social or chance gatherings not intended to evade the statute,
on-site inspections of public projects and programs, travel to and at-
tendance at meetings of organizations devoted to improving govern-
ment and attendance at political party caucuses "held for purposes
of planning political strategy and holding discussions designed to
prepare the members for taking official action." 5
It is clear by that definition that Indiana makes no effort to
prevent officials from conferring privately and informally among
themselves in small groups of less than a majority. The legislature,
in choosing the word "majority" as a functional test, rejected
Florida and Colorado approaches which find a meeting whenever
two or more are gathered together.3" Indiana legislators, in drafting
the majority requirement, followed the lead taken by most of the
states. The basis for the decision was two-fold: 1) The public is never
in danger until enough members of the body are present for taking
official action, and 2) officials, like other human beings, need some
opportunity to discuss public issues among themselves in an infor-
mal manner.37 In short, they need room to breathe.
The legislative drafters also rejected the "quorum" concept used
in a number of states and proposed by the Common Cause model
statute.," Quorum, as defined by the model statute, is a simple ma-
jority. So defined, the practical effect of a choice between "quorum"
and "majority" makes little difference from the standpoint of clarity.
Where not so defined, however, the idea of a quorum introduces a
potential loophole because officials comprising a majority but less
34. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(c) (Supp. 1979).
35. Id.
36. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-9-101 (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (Supp.
1979).
37. Most of the state statutes define it in terms of a majority or
quorum. The theory is that if enough get together to take action then you
are in danger. The legislators would argue that anything less than that
stifles discussion. They wouldn't be able to even get together for coffee.
We also provided for social and chance gatherings. It makes them feel
more at ease.
Cardwell Interview, Oct. 25, 1979.
38. See Tacha, The Kansas Open Meeting Act: Sunshine on the Sunflower
State? 25 KAN. L. REV. 169, 182 (1977).
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than a quorum could convene a closed meeting, discuss the issues,
reach a resolution and agree to vote accordingly at a subsequent
open meeting. 9 Obviously, a pro forma public vote following closed
deliberation is precisely what the open meetings acts are intended
to discourage.
Tennessee, a state which uses the word quorum, introduced an
interesting ambiguity by making "quorum" not only a limitation but
also a condition. Under the Tennessee Sunshine Law, a meeting is
"the convening of a governing body . . . for which a quorum is re-
quired in order to make a decision .. .on any matter."4 To be a
meeting under the statute and thereby open to the public, the
gathering must be of the type for which a quorum is required. That
definition is considerably different from Indiana's. Tennessee ap-
parently would permit closed gatherings of a majority whenever a
quorum is not specifically required by law, whereas, in most in-
stances, the mere presence of a majority in Indiana would trigger
application of the statute. Moreover, in Tennessee, by simply voting
to eliminate quorum requirements, officials could evade the act
altogether. 1 Indiana's statute, drafted with the benefit of extensive
commentary on the experience of other states, avoids this particular
problem.
Indiana's decision to limit coverage of the act to majority
gatherings clearly does nothing to prevent a minority with political
and persuasive power from gathering to discuss public business.'"
The choice reflects the conviction, noted earlier, that the danger
which arises from closed gatherings arises when the opportunity
exists for public officials to make commitments as a voting major-
ity. 3 Although language declaring that a meeting be open whenever
two or more members are present may be more effective and inflex-
ible,"" the softer Indiana approach reflects an effort to balance the in-
terests of public officials in informal conversation and the public's
right to know what government is doing. In Indiana, moreover, it
also reflects a realistic compromise. A stronger bill would have a dif-
ficult time getting through the General Assembly, but anything
weaker would not be worth the effort.' 5
39. See Comment, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, supra note 3, at 1170.
40. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Supp. 1974).
41. For a general discussion of the problem, see Hollow, 42 TENN. L. REv. 527,
supra note 17, at 540.
42. See Comment, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, supra note 3, at 1170.
43. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
44. Comment, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, supra note 3, at 1170.
45. Cardwell Interview, Oct. 25, 1979. See note 37 supra.
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Closely related to this concern for permitting private breathing
space for public officials is the statute's protection of officials' social
lives. This kind of protection has become a standard item in open
meeting laws and is based on the recognition that it is common for
people who have daily contact at work to establish social relation-
ships during nonworking hours. The reasoning is that an open
meetings law so strong that its scope would be construed to cover
discussions of public policy incidental to social encounters is
unreasonably restrictive."' The act, therefore, protects social gather-
ings and unplanned, chance gatherings, even of a majority, so long
as they are not intended to evade the statute. 7 Commentators con-
cede the protection is fraught with danger of abuse." Illegal
meetings, under the guise of social or chance gatherings, are dif-
ficult to discover or to prove. Some social gatherings, however, such
as pre-meeting dinners or weekly bridge games where a majority is
frequently present should be suspect.
In addition to social or chance gatherings, the act protects on-
site inspections of projects and programs, travel and attendance at
meetings of organizations devoted to better government, and the
political caucus." Each of these are non-meetings in the sense that
they are specifically not included in the definition of a meeting. An
interesting question arises, however, when the officials at one of
these non-meetings decide to take some official action. For example,
officials inspecting a public works project might decide to order
some changes in specifications and so direct the engineer at the job
site.5 It would be a simple matter to vote on those changes later at
an open meeting, although the changes have already privately been
ordered and the vote provides nothing more than an announcement.
In exchange for this freedom to associate, to travel and to inspect,
the public official clearly bears a burden of responsibility. The
legislators have not seen fit to remove every opportunity for eva-
sion, but to grant some expectation of trust.
46. See Comment, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, supra note 3, at 1170.
47. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(c)(i) (1977), as amended, (Supp. 1979).
48. Comment, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, supra note 3, at 1170.
49. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(c)(iv) (Supp. 1979). A caucus is defined as "a gather-
ing of members of a political party or coalition which is held for purposes of planning
political strategy and holding discussions designed to prepare the members for taking
official action." IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(h) (Supp. 1979).
50. Concerned School Citizens of Garrett sued the Garrett-Keyser-Butler
School District in DeKalb Circuit Court, alleging it had failed to give proper notice of a
meeting of the board at Fort Wayne. The board had gone there to the office of an arch-
itect to review construction plans. The complaint alleges, also, that the meeting was
not open and that final action was taken during it (deletion of $500,000 worth of items
from the proposal and a decision not to build an auxiliary gymnasium).
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Under certain circumstances, even a majority of the members
of a public body can be gathered together without the gathering be-
ing termed a meeting. The gathering of the majority must be "for
the purpose of taking official action." 5' The legislature has broadly
defined "official action" to include receiving information, discussing
public business, making recommendations, establishing policy, mak-
ing decisions on public business or voting." Because of the manner
in which these definitions intermesh, it is apparent that the
legislature was aware that some form of "official action" is likely to
occur at a social gathering of a majority of members of a public
body. So long, however, as that gathering was not arranged for the
purpose of taking official action, the activity is protected. It may be
challenged on other grounds, but without some showing that the
body intended to take official action, there seems little room to
argue that what occurred was a meeting required to be open under
the act. The loophole, however, is a small one compared to that
created by the notion of caucus as a non-meeting.
The statute defines caucus as a gathering of the members of a
political party or coalition which is held for the purposes of planning
political strategy and holding discussions designed to prepare the
members for taking official action. 3 The act also provides that a
caucus is not a meeting covered under the law." In the original ver-
sion of the bill, caucuses were included as meetings and were listed
among those which could be closed." The House action in making a
caucus a "non-meeting" rather than an executive session took the
political strategy session completely out of the reach of the statute.
As an executive session, the caucus would have been subject to re-
quirements that public notice and identity of the subject matter be
posted and provided to the news media. Moreover, the act forbids a
body from ordinarily conducting an executive session during the
meeting, but if a caucus is not a meeting at all, there is nothing to
prevent a political faction or coalition of a board from meeting
privately as a caucus without notice, at any time, even if that caucus
constitutes a majority of the members on a board or commission.
The caucus exemption is a major potential weakness in the act, and
is virtually impossible to police. Planning political strategy and
51. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(c) (Supp. 1979).
52. IND. CODE §§ 5-14-1.5-2(d)(1) to -2(d)(5) (Supp. 1979).
53. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(h) (Supp. 1979).
54. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(c) (Supp. 1979).
55. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, 100th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1977), at 720.
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preparing members to take official action, where "official action" in-
cludes voting, provides handy camouflage for action which the
statute specifically intends to prevent.5
The caucus issue was, in fact, the most volatile issue threaten-
ing defeat of the open meetings act. 7 The state legislature in In-
diana is included in the coverage of the act and the legislature uses
the caucus traditionally and frequently. The caucus privilege is
jealously guarded by the members of the General Assembly and
practical politics makes it unlikely that any bill eliminating the
private, political discussions could get enough support to pass.5 8
Under the caucus exemption, it is possible for a majority of a
city council to meet privately for the purpose of taking official ac-
tion upon public business, provided all members of the majority
gathered belong to the same political party or coalition. The
loophole is enormous and is far more significant than that posed by
social or chance gatherings of a majority. A political group con-
stituting a majority on a governing body can do precisely what the
act directs not be done: intentionally meeting to take action on
public business. Under these circumstances, then, it is curious to
note that there have been few problems with the caucus at the local
level and few complaints by the press. 9 This may be, of course,
either because the caucus is not being abused or because it is being
56. In enacting this chapter, the general assembly finds and declares
that this state and its political subdivisions exist only to aid in the con-
duct of the business of the citizens of this state. It is the intent of this
chapter that the deliberations and actions of public agencies be conducted
and taken openly, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, in
order that the citizens may be fully informed.
IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-1 (Supp. 1979).
57. "This (the caucus) was the most volatile issue. The legislature is included
in the act and the legislators caucus when somebody sneezes. They just didn't want
any limitation on their ability to caucus." Cardwell Interview, Oct. 25, 1979.
58. In 1977, when the House took out the Senate's addition of "partisan
political activities" from the executive sessions and deleted "caucus" from
that section, some senators thought they were leaving the caucus un-
protected. During the explanation to the Senate, it was said that they (the
House) eliminated the caucus. We almost lost the whole thing on the
caucus question.
Id.
59. There have been almost no complaints about the caucus at the local
level. It does allow a lot, though.. Terre Haute has seven Democrats and
one Republican (on the city council). All the law has done there is to keep
the Republican out of the closed caucus of the seven Democrats. They still
get together to meet.
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used discreetly enough to avoid criticism. Whatever the reason, the
legislature has provided that political groups may caucus privately,
the effect of which is a kind of escape valve from the pressure of
open discussion. It is a recognition that if the law is to work to keep
the formal processes open to the public, there must inevitably be
some allowance for informal interaction.0
Problems, however, do arise when officials stray from the
statutory definition of a caucus. In Indiana, the word "caucus" has
been used to describe a political convention procedure whereby the
party in power elects a replacement for a public official of that par-
ty who has resigned his office." During the 1979 amendment pro-
cedure, an effort was made to amend the statute to require that
form of local "caucus" be open to the public. The argument was
made that the election procedure was not a true caucus as defined
and that, moreover, that form of local political convention was of the
type of thing intended to be covered.62 The amendment was defeated
in the Senate, leaving the issue unanswered. 3 The practical political
lesson was that the concept of caucus remains an untouchable and
highly sensitive issue for the legislature. The statutory privilege
cannot be distrubed even to clarify that a county-level convention
cannot be secret just because the county chairman likes to call it a
caucus. 
6 4
60. Access, to an extent, is a sham. No matter how you read the law,
guys are going to talk together. The reason the open committee meetings
(in the General Assembly) work is because it has not really inhibited their
ability to meet. It has opened up the formal process. That is the reason it
works. They can still go on their happy way pretty much. Id.
61. IND. CODE § 3-2-9-2 (1976), provides:
Vacancies in all elective county, township, city and town offices, except
the offices of prosecuting attorney, clerk of the circuit court, and judge of
any court, shall be filled for the unexpired term by a caucus as provided
in this chapter, any other provisions of the law to the contrary not-
withstanding.
62. "It is not really a caucus. It really is a convention. We could take the posi-
tion that it falls under 2(a)(2)'s 'any entity'". Cardwell Interview, Oct. 25, 1979. The sec-
tion referred to by Cardwell provides: "Public agency means: any county, township,
school corporation, city, town, political subdivision, or other entity, by whatever name
designated, exercising in a limited geographical area the executive, administrative, or
legislative power of the state or a delegated local governmental power." IND. CODE §
5-14-1.5-2(a)(2) (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
63. At the present time, access to these conventions is at the discretion of the
local party chairman. No court challenge has been made, but if it were to be made, it
would likely focus on § 2(a)(2) rather than on the caucus definition. The vote defeating
the caucus amendment in 1979 was 35 to 12. Cardwell Interview, Oct. 25, 1979.
64. "You just can't interfere with the caucus right and get a bill through the
legislature. It is a very sensitive issue." Cardwell Interview, Oct. 25, 1979.
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Indiana's definition of a meeting reflects the stress of political
compromise and a balancing of political and public interests. While
the definition clearly protects, for public scrutiny, all of the formal
processes of decision making, it also allows considerable freedom for
public officials to meet and discuss public issues informally. How-
ever, while allowing considerable leeway for the interests of public
officials, the act stretches its net over nearly every aspect of public
business except the judiciary.
Governing Bodies
As critical as determining whether the gathering of officials is
a "meeting" is the question of whether the body is one intended to
be covered by the statute. The states generally have taken three ap-
proaches to determining the governmental agencies covered by their
acts. Some simply list by type the government bodies whose
meetings are open. 5 Others focus on the exercise of governmental
power by an agency. Still others define coverage in broad terms
based on public funding.' However, the trend during the 1970s, a
trend which Indiana followed, has been toward some combination of
these devices to insure sufficient breadth of coverage.
The governing body of a public agency in Indiana includes any
board, commission, council or other body which takes official action
upon public business and includes any committee appointed by the
governing body or its presiding officer if the committee has been
delegated authority to take official action on public business. To
determine what is and what is not a public agency, the act lists five
sweeping definitions." If an organization fits any one of the five, it
65. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.2 (Supp. 1979).
66. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 1, § 402 (1964).
67. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 304 (Supp. 1979).
68. See Wickham, Let the Sun Shine in! Open Meeting Legislation Can be
Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 480, 483
(1973).
69. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(b) (Supp. 1979).
70. Public agency means: (1) any board, commission, department, agen-
cy or authority, by whatever name designated, exercising a portion of the
executive, administrative, or legislative power of the state; (2) any county,
township, school corporation, city, town, political subdivision, or other en-
tity, by whatever name designated, exercising in a limited geographical
area the executive, administrative, or legislative power of the state or a
delegated local governmental power; (3) any entity which is subject to
either: (i) budget review by either the state board of tax commissioners or
the governing body of a county, city, town, township, or school corpora-
tion; or (ii) audit by the state board of accounts; (4) any building corpora-
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is a public agency, and its governing body must open its meetings to
the public. To be a governing body, however, the group must be one
that can take official action, and the act provides another five
sweeping definitions of "official action."7 The string of definitions
are key elements in determining coverage of the act. They also
reflect an attempt to avoid the ambiguity and confusion that has
swirled about open meeting legislation in other states. For example,
prior to 1977 Delaware provided merely that "boards and commis-
sions" be open to the public," the weakness being that such a vague
description could be read to exclude such public bodies as city coun-
cils or public authorities from coverage. Other states use broad but
more specific catch-all tests, such as whether the agency receives or
uses public funds.73 But that test, too, has problems. An unqualified
public funds test could reach the administration of private colleges,
for example, while missing public governmental commissions respon-
sible for policy decisions but without a budget. 74 Indiana legislators
rejected the "funds test" during early committee hearings and chose
instead to use as one of the factors defining a public agency a con-
sideration of whether that agency was subject to budget review by
state or local government or to an audit by the state board of ac-
counts. An agency using public money but not subject to such a
review is outside the act.
75
Another ambiguous test often applied has been the "official ac-
tion" requirement. If not clearly defined by statute, the test could
be as broad or as narrow as a court would be willing to accept.6 In-
tion of a political subdivision of the state of Indiana that issues bonds for
the purpose of constructing public facilities; or (5) any advisory commis-
sion, committee, or body created by statute, ordinance, or executive order
to advise the governing body of a public agency, except medical staffs or
the committees of such staff.
IND. CODE §§ 5-14-1.5-2(a)(1) to -2(a)(5) (Supp. 1979).
71. "Official action means: (1) to receive information or to deliberate on public
business; (2) to make recommendations pursuant to statute, ordinance, or executive
order; (3) to establish policy; (4) to make decisions on public business; or (5) to take
final action." IND. CODE §§ 5-14-1.5-2(d)(1) to -2(d)(5) (Supp. 1979).
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 5109 (Supp. 1974).
73. See Comment, 45 Miss. L.J., supra note 3, at 1165.
74. A 1976 draft of the Indiana act provided a public funds test: "Public agen-
cy means: (7) any public institution, including public service industries, either directly
owned by the state of Indiana or any of its political subdivisions, in whole or in part
with other municipalities, or supported in whole or in part by contributions or levy of
public funds." H. 1237, 99th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1976).
75. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(a)(3) (Supp. 1979), quoted at note 70 supra.
76. See Board of Public Instruction v. Doran, 224 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1969)
(holding the Florida law constitutional against an attack on grounds of vagueness).
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diana's five-prong definitions of public agency and official action
make it clear the legislature intended to include the governing
bodies of every state and local governmental unit, including their
advisory commissions and building corporations, which receive infor-
mation, discuss public business, make recommendations, establish
policy or make decisions. While it is a broad and far-reaching
statute, it does not include every possible group having an effect on
the public welfare. The act, significantly, does not include private
organizations spending state money, nor does it touch the internal
staff operations of public agencies. Moreover, the act allows some
exceptions where interests of privacy and efficiency appear to de-
mand them."
Exemptions
Besides the specified non-meetings as defined in the "not-
include" clause of the meeting definition,78 the Indiana act also pro-
vides that it is the intent of the legislature that the deliberations
and actions of public agencies be conducted and taken openly unless
otherwise expressly provided by statute." It is an important limita-
tion and, in light of the national history of open meeting legislation,
there is significance in the word "statute." Some states, such as
Kansas and Arkansas have included language making the act apply
unless otherwise provided for by law,80 an ambiguous term that at
least theoretically gives those who would circumvent the law a
powerful tool. "Law" can be construed to include any judicial deci-
sion, state or federal statute, administrative ruling or local or-
dinance. The exemption "by law" allows almost any governmental
body to exempt itself from the open meetings requirement by mere-
ly passing its own law.'
Florida and Tennessee expressly require exceptions to the act
to be based only on constitutional grounds.2' Consequently, Ten-
nessee provides only one exception to the open meeting statute, and
77. Unresolved is whether the act covers an agency administering a federal
program where the administrators of the federal funds are appointed by the county
council. In the Delaware Superior Court (Muncie, Ind.), a CETA advisory board is ac-
cused of holding an executive session in violation of the Open Door Law. A motion to
dismiss was denied on May 2, 1979. Muncie Newspapers Inc. v. Board of Commis-
sioners, No. 2S-78/1165 (Delaware Superior Court, filed Dec. 13, 1978).
78. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(c) (Supp. 1979).
79. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-1 (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
80. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318(a) (Supp. 1978).
81. See Tacha, 25 KAN. L. REV., supra note 38, at 183.
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Supp. 1979).
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that relates to the General Assembly." Beyond that constitutional
exception, application of the Tennessee open meeting act necessarily
depends on how the term "governing body" and "meeting" are defined.
A statute exempting a governmental unit from the open meeting
requirement would not suffice. Such a statute would be sufficient in
Indiana, however. Between the severe limitations of a constitutional
exception and the very broad concept of exception by law, is In-
diana's provision for exception by statute. Like many of the provi-
sions of the act, it reflects a middle-of-the-road approach. While
acknowledging the possible need for exceptions to the act, it makes
it necessary to subject proposed exceptions to the rigors of debate
and compromise in the legislature. Since passage of the Open Door
Law in 1977, only one statutory exemption has been enacted."
Although statutes expressly exempting a governing body are
possible, it is the language of the Open Door Law itself which pro-
vides for the most important exemptions. The act provides that
meetings of judicial bodies are exempt from the requirements of the
act." Administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions,
however, are not specifically exempt. Some states, on the other
hand, do exempt quasi-judicial bodies," and the Supreme Court of
Florida has held that quasi-judicial bodies are exempt from Florida's
Sunshine Law even though no specific exemption is written into the
act."7 The Indiana act also provides an exemption for medical staffs
and their committees, certainly an area where the public's right to
know about what government is doing is less direct. A meeting of
hospital administrators, however, clearly falls within the act, in-
cluding a meeting to receive a report from a medical staff commit-
tee.
Some states" exempt meetings of parole boards where the sole
83. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 22 provides: "The doors of each House and the com-
mittees of the whole shall be kept open, unless when the business shall be such as
ought to be kept secret."
84. IND. CODE § 31-5.5-3-15 (Supp. 1979) provides that meetings of Child Pro-
tection Teams are exempt from the Open Door Law. IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5-10 (1977),
enacted before the Open Door Law, provides for procedure for closed discipline hear-
ings in public schools.
85. The act addresses itself only to executive, administrative and legislative
bodies. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2 (Supp. 1979).
86. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4318 (Supp.
1978).
87. Cannon v. Board of Public Instruction, 231 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1970).
88. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22(D) (1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-345
(1979).
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purpose of the meeting is to pardon or parole an inmate. Indiana
does not. Another exemption in several states are meetings between
public bodies and their lawyers. The Indiana act does not specifical-
ly address this question, although it does provide that a body may
go into executive session to discuss strategy with respect to initia-
tion of litigation or litigation which is either pending or has been
threatened specifically in writing."9 Statutes elsewhere which have
not specifically exempted the attorney-client relationship between a
public body and its attorney have not been treated uniformly by the
courts." The Florida open meetings law has been held to constitute
a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as between a public agency
and its attorney. The court in that case did, however, protect the
ethical obligations of the attorney by allowing him to demand con-
fidentiality when he has reason to believe that an ethical obligation
would be breached by disclosure." In Indiana, the attorney-client
privilege is deeply ingrained in the law and it is not likely that a
serious challenge could be raised.
Some states also exempt law enforcement agencies,92 military
organizations,93  public hospital staffs," university boards of
trustees,95 pollution control boards,"' juvenile correction agencies,"
and prison commissions." These wide-ranging, blanket exemptions
frustrate the intent of legislation whose purpose is to permit the
general public to observe government decision making and the
deliberations which precede it. The usual argument for an exemp-
89. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-6(a)(ii) (Supp. 1979). See text accompanying notes 113
to 116 infra.
90. Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968) (holding that the
client-attorney privilege could not be applied to consultation and discussions with the
attorney outside of litigation); Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County
Board of Supervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968) (holding that the
open meeting law had not removed the attorney-client privilege, but that neither "the
attorney's presence nor the happenstance of some kind of lawsuit may serve as the
pretext for secret consultations whose revelation will not injure the public interest.")
91. Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).
92. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.4 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
93. Prior to 1979, Iowa expressly exempted military organizations. IOWA CODE
ANN. § 28A.6 (1978). Effective 1979, Iowa revised its open meetings statute along lines
similar to Indiana's. IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A (Supp. 1979).
94. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(d)(4) (Supp. 1975).
95. In 1979, Virginia deleted subdivision (5) of VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-345 which
expressly exempted university trustees. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-345 (1979).
96. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 11126 (Supp. 1979).
97. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705 (1977).
98. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
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tion is that because judgments made by the agencies are based on
highly sensitive information, effectiveness depends on their ability to
proceed in confidence.99 Closely related are arguments that the agen-
cy deals with people whose reputations may be unnecessarily
damaged. Likewise, in cases involving acquisition of real estate,
forceful arguments can be made that for competitive reasons the
agency should be exempt from the act. These broad, general exemp-
tions, however, have not been the approach taken by Indiana or
most other states concerned with a need to balance concerns of
privacy and security with the public's right to know about govern-
ment operations.
Exemptions of agencies which otherwise come within the
definitions section of the Indiana statute are rare. Instead, Indiana
has shown a preference to pull nearly all governing bodies within
the range of the act and provide for specific kinds of closed
meetings only when privacy, security or competitive advantage
outweigh the need for openness. By keeping the agencies within the
act, closed meetings can be monitored and controlled by notice re-
quirements and subject-matter limitations.
Executive Sessions
In Indiana, as in most states today, statutory access by the
public to governmental meetings is the rule, and secrecy is the ex-
ception.00 The exceptions stem from the idea that while government
must be open to the voters if democracy is to succeed, sometimes it
is necessary for government to work free of public scrutiny to be ef-
fective. At least three statutory methods exist for permitting closed
meetings. The first, as discussed above, is to carefully define the
kinds of activities and bodies covered so as to put those activities
and bodies outside the reach of the statute. Indiana has done this by
defining gatherings as meetings only when a majority is present and
only when the body involved is one that exercises or shares ex-
ecutive, administrative or legislative power. 0'° The second method,
also discussed above, is to specifically name organizations as excep-
tions notwithstanding the language of the act. Indiana has used this
method to exempt Child Protection Teams.' 2 Finally, open meeting
99. See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963).
100. See Papadoupoulos v. State Board of Higher Education, 8 Ore. App. 445,
494 P.2d 260 (1972).
101. See text accompanying notes 36-77 supra.
102. See note 84 supra.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 [1980], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol14/iss2/3
OPEN DOORS
statutes may expressly grant public bodies the option of having closed
sessions under certain circumstances even though the bodies them-
selves are not excluded from coverage of the act.' 3
As passed in 1977, the Indiana act provided for a few closely
limited opportunities for executive sessions."4 After establishing the
parameters of coverage in the definition section,"5 the act provided
that any government falling within those parameters could meet
privately for only six reasons, all of which were based on preserving
the rights and welfare of individuals as citizens and taxpayers. As
might be expected, the executive session section of the act was an
area of considerable discussion by the legislators. Both the House
and the Senate members were concerned that political strategy
meetings be kept closed. The Senate added "partisan political ac-
tivities" to the list of executive sessions although such activities
were arguably already covered by the "caucus" exception.", Both
items were eventually dropped from the list of allowable executive
sessions by the House which took the much stronger action of mak-
ing the political caucus a non-meeting under the act, protecting it
completely.'0 7
In 1979, the executive session section was revised and the list
of categories increased from six to eight."8 The changes were an at-
103. For a general discussion of executive sessions, see Comment, 45 Miss.
L.J., supra note 3, at 1172-76.
104. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-6 (1977) provided:
(a) Executive sessions may be held only in the following instances:
(i) where authorized by federal or state statute; (ii) for discussion of
strategy with respect to: collective bargaining, pending or threatened
litigation, the implementation of security systems, or the purchase of prop-
erty, if for competitive or bargaining reasons such discussion is necessary;
(iii) interviews with industrial or commercial propects or their agents; (iv)
interviews with prospective employees; (v) with respect to any individual
over whom the governing body has jurisdiction: to receive information
concerning the individual's alleged misconduct, or to discuss prior to any
determination, the individual's employment or other status; (vi) for discus-
sion of records classified as confidential by state or federal statute.
105. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2 (1977).
106. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 100th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1977) at 79.
107. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, 100th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1977) at 682,
720. See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
108. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-6(a) (Supp. 1979) provides:
(a) Executive sessions may be held only in the following instances:
(i) where authorized by federal or state statute; (ii) for discussion of
strategy with respect to: collective bargaining, initiation of litigation or
litigation which is either pending or has been threatened specifically in
19801
Dilts: The "Open Door" Laws: An Appraisal of Open Meeting Legislation in
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1980
314 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.14
tempt to clarify ambiguities, close loopholes and protect official
discussion about employee performance and student placement."°9
Specific parts of the section were given an extensive overhaul.
Originally the act provided that executive sessions could be held for
discussion of strategy with respect to a) collective bargaining, b)
pending or threatened litigation, c) the implementation of security
systems or, d) the purchase of property, "if for competitive or
bargaining reasons such discussion is necessary.""0 In rewriting the
subsection, the legislators changed items b and d and strengthened
the wording of the conditional clause at the end. Item d now pro-
vides for discussions of strategy in respect to "the purchase or lease
of real property up to the time a contrart or option to purchase or
lease is executed by the parties.' Item b now provides exective
session "for discussion of strategy with respect to ... initiation of
litigation or litigation which is either pending or has been threat-
ened specifically in writing.""2 Under the amendment, it is clear that
strategy planning can include discussion about who to sue as well as
strategy concerning a threatened lawsuit against the governing
body. Also, the amendment makes it clear that an oral threat of a
lawsuit is not sufficient to close a meeting for purposes of a strategy
discussion.
Despite these changes, however, a basic problem of interpreta-
tion exists about what is and what is not a "strategy session." Does
it include, for example, meetings between the governing body and
the opposing litigant in an effort to reach an out-of-court settlement?
That question has arisen in Indiana at least three times. In LaPorte
an executive session between the county commissioners and the
writing, the implementation of security systems, or the purchase or lease
of real property up to the time a contract or option to purchase or lease is
executed by the parties; however, all such strategy discussions must be
necessary for competitive or bargaining reasons; (iii) interviews with in-
dustrial or commercial prospects or their agents; (iv) interviews with pro-
spective employees; (v) with respect to any individual over whom the
governing body has jurisdiction: to receive information concerning the in-
dividual's status as an employee, student, or independent contractor; (vi)
for discussion of records classified as confidential by state or federal
statute; (vii) to discuss before any placement decision an individual stu-
dent's abilities, past performance, behavior, and needs; and (viii) to
discuss a job performance evaluation of individual employees.
109. Cardwell Interview, Oct. 25, 1979. As with the drafting of the initial
legislation, Cardwell was the chief lobbyist for the amendments.
110. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-6 (1977).
111. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-6(a)(iii) (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
112. Id.
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NAACP to discuss settlement of a dispute about a proposed county
affirmative action plan was opened to the public when the press
complained."' However, in Fort Wayne a closed session was held at
the urging of federal court judge for settlement of litigation filed
against a school board by black citizens over desegregation plans,
and in Valparaiso, a trial court judge refused to enjoin a closed
meeting between the county council and the county welfare depart-
ment to discuss settlement of a dispute over salaries."" Although
there is no evidence that the precise parameters of "strategy" was
ever discussed by the legislators, the structure of the statute itself
indicates that strategy was not a concept intended to cover bargain-
ing between adversary parties. The term, with its military history,"
implies some kind of preparation for assault or compromise with the
enemy, rather than the actual battle itself. The subsection, read in
its entirety, would seem to support the view that a discussion about
what to do and how to do it was intended to be a one-sided affair.
For example, the subsection provides for discussion of strategy in
respect to collective bargaining but not for collective bargaining
itself; it provides strategy discussion about implementation of
security systems because public discussion would, of course, make
the systems vulnerable; it provides for closed strategy discussions
about the purchase or lease of real property clearly because of the
danger that open discussion would drive up prices excessively. In
none of those instances would it be prudent or reasonable to invite
the opposing side to the strategy session. The public isn't invited
because the public includes precisely those criminals, property
owners and labor orgainzations with whom the government is in
conflict. It would seem, then, that the better view is that meetings
between the governing body and a litigant are something other than
strategy sessions and are not protected by Section 6 of the act. The
litigant is precisely the person who should be excluded from the op-
posing side's strategy discussions, and if it is not a strategy discus-
sion, the act requires that it be open to the public."'
A related problem is whether this section provides protection
for a closed meeting between a majority of the governing body and
the body's attorney. Certainly, if the body can meet privately to
113. Cardwell Interview, Oct. 25, 1979.
114. Id.
115. Strategia is the Greek word meaning generalship.
116. "The rationale for the strategy exception is that if government is in an
adversary relationship, it shouldn't be put at a disadvantage. Or if it is in litigation,
same thing. The act shouldn't put government in a competitive disadvantage." Card-
well Interview, Oct. 25, 1979.
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discuss strategy about pending litigation, it also can meet privately
with its attorney for the same reason. In addition, the body might
claim a recognized client-attorney privilege." If a majority of the
body meets with opposing counsel, however, the meeting does not
appear to be protected since it is arguably not a strategy session.
Because of these limitations, a proper solution to reaching an out-of-
court settlement with a litigant would be for the governing body to
consult and instruct its attorney and then permit the attorney to at-
tempt a resolution of the differences. This is particularly true when
the opposing litigant is another governing body. Each body might
properly instruct its attorney to meet with opposing counsel to pur-
sue a course of settlement discussed in a closed strategy session."8
The only difficulty with such an arrangement, however, is that the
attorney may be construed as acting as a committee of one
representing the governing body."9 If such a position would be
adopted, he would fall under the reach of the act without protection
under Section 6.120 Under such a strained definition of the committee
concept, the act would not provide any protection for secret, out-of-
court negotiations between public bodies. That is not a policy posi-
tion that the legislature clearly adopted, but it does conform to the
general notion that secret deals are precisely what the statute was
designed to eliminate. When public agencies are involved in a
mutual litigious conflict, the public might well demand to know what
is going on, why it has happened and what is being done about it.
The 1979 amendment also attempted to make it clear that even
sessions that could be classified as strategy sessions may not always
be protected as executive sessions. The legislators substituted the
words "if for competive or bargaining reasons such discussion is
necessary" with the stronger "all such strategy discussions must be
necessary for competitive or bargaining reasons."'' If a strategy
117. See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
118. As a practical matter, you can't separate strategy from the decision
making. If you have a pending desegregation case, you have a right to
discuss strategy. The attorney says, "I think we should hire this law firm,
and here are five plans we can propose to the court in the hearing tomor-
row." The committee then says our strategy is to hire the law firm and to
present the five plans. It may be strategy, but they are making decisions.
Cardwell Interview, Oct. 25, 1979.
119. But even Cardwell would reject the notion of a committee of one. "At
Valparaiso, the two attorneys could have met. A committee is more than one person."
Id.
120. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(b) (Supp. 1979) provides in part: "Governing body ...
includes any committee appointed by the governing body or its presiding officer to
which authority to take official action upon public business has been delegated."
121. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-6(a)(ii) (Supp. 1979).
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session cannot be justified on such a basis, it is not protected by
Section 6.
The other major changes in Section 6 were the personnel con-
duct provisions. Subsection v, which permitted the reception of in-
formation concerning an individual's alleged misconduct "or to discuss
prior to any determination, the individual's employment or other
status," was changed to read "and to discuss, prior to any determina-
tion, that individual's status as an employee, student, or indepen-
dent contractor."'" The language now makes it clear that the gover-
ning body is not limited to discussions only about employees. The
change specifically protects the privacy of students and independent
contractors. In addition to discussions about the individual's status
as an employee, student or independent contractor, the act now also
provides protection under subsection vii for discussions about a stu-
dent's abilities, past performance, behavior and needs before any
decision about placement is made. Subsection viii extends similar
protection to discussion about job performance evaluation of indi-
vidual employees.
It is apparent from these additions that the legislature is in-
terested in protecting the legitimate privacy concerns of individuals
not elected to office and whose private reputations may suffer un-
justly because of a public inquiry. However, it should be noted that
while the discussions themselves may be closed to the public, the
governing body is required to take final action only at a meeting
122. Cardwell, in a paper prepared for press association members, provided
this explanation of the changes:
The original intent of the law was to create a limited allowance for discus-
sion of alleged misconduct of an individual and for discussion of that in-
dividual's status. The "or other" was inserted because hospital boards
wanted to be able to discuss recommendations of medical staffs about
physicians, who are independent contractors, not employees; therefore,
"or other" (status) was intended to modify "employee." This language was
seized upon by agencies to call executive sessions any time there was a
discussion about a "personnel" matter.
The legislature's amendment to Sec. 6(a)(v) is intended to clarify its
original intent about the limited scope of allowable executive sessions and
to make it a "straight-line" procedure for receipt of information about a
specific individual's alleged misconduct and to discuss, prior to a deter-
mination, that specific individual's status. The legislature added "student"
as a category (in addition to employees and independent contractors over
whom there is jurisdiction) of individuals who might be subject to this
allowance for discussion.
Internal paper by Richard Cardwell for the Hoosier State Press Association (Sept. 1,
1979).
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open to the public,12 and- public notice of the executive sessions
must be given before the meeting and must include notice of the
purpose or subject matter.12
Indiana's allowance for and restrictions of executive sessions
are consistent with the approaches taken by most states in this area
of open meeting legislation, an area where there has been con-
siderable experience and commentary. 15 Generally, the states have
taken two approaches toward executive sessions, the subject-matter
approach, which is the one used in Indiana, and the final-action ap-
proach. When subject matter is used as the criterion for determining
when an executive session is permitted, the statutes simply list the
permitted subjects. This is the approach taken by most states, and
the lists reflect remarkable uniformity.'" The final-action approach
used by a minority of states, differs in that it permits governing
bodies to meet in closed session at their discretion provided the
final vote or decision takes place in public. The second approach
does not significantly alter the pre-statutory situation since the ap-
proach fails to ensure the public an open meeting in which the of-
ficials conduct full discussions of the issues, resolve differences and
come to conclusions.1
In those states which use the subject-matter listing as a guide
to determining what kinds of meetings can be closed, common ex-
perience among the states has largely limited the list to five areas
of concern: 1) personnel administration in the areas of hiring, firing,
compensation and discipline of public employees, 2) matters that
123. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-6(b) (Supp. 1979).
124. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-6(c) (Supp. 1979).
125. See Douglas, New Hampshire Right to Know Law, An Analysis, 16 N.H.
B.J. 227 (1975); Guy & McDonald, Government in the Sunshine: The Status of Open
Meetings and Open Records Laws in North Dakota, 53 N.D.L. REV. 51 (1976); Hollow,
42 TENN. L. REV., supra note 17; Little, Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An
Insider's View, 53 N.C.L. REV. 451 (1975); Tacha, 25 KAN. L. REV., supra note 38;
Wickham, 68 Nw. U. L. REV., supra note 68; Note, Public Access to Government
Records and Meetings in Arizona, 16 ARIz. L. REV. 891 (1974); Note, Pennsylvania
Right to Know Statute: A Creature of the Legislature Shaped by the Judiciary, 82
DICK. L. REV. 749 (1978); Note, 75 HAR. L. REV., supra note 10; Note, Ohio Open
Meeting Statute-School Boards, 3 OHIO NORTH L. REV. 176 (1975); Comment, Open
Meeting Laws in Michigan, 53 J. URBAN L. 532 (1976); Comment, 45 Miss. L.J., supra
note 3; Comment, Ambiguities in Oregon" Open Meeting Legislation, 53 ORE. L. REV.
339 (1974); Comment, Open Meetings in Virginia, 8 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 261 (1974).
126. See, e.g. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 82-3402 (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25 § 307 (Supp. 1979); ORE. REV. STAT. § 192.660(1) (Supp. 1973).
127. For a brief discussion of the problems raised by the approach, see Note,
75 HARV. L. REV., supra note 10, at 1210.
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tend to prejudice the reputation and character of an individual, 3)
real estate transactions, 4) public safety involving clear and immi-
nent peril and 5) labor negotiations. The policy considerations
behind these limited exceptions are considerations about rights of
personal privacy and public interest concerns for keeping those
who would damage the public's bargaining position or security from
obtaining ammunition to do so."u A number of states also list such
items as requests for anonymity made by a donor in a gift or be-
quest to the agency,'" deliberations regarding the bestowing of
honorary degrees," examination materials in meetings of licensing
and examining boards,13 1 preliminary negotiations involving matters
of trade or commerce in which the governing body is in competition
with governing bodies in other states or nations."3 '
Indiana, while allowing for the most common concerns about
personal privacy, public security and competitive position, has not
gone much beyond what has been done elsewhere and in most in-
stances has not gone as far. The Indiana act closely circumscribes
the topics of bargaining and competition by limiting sessions to
discussions of strategy. Even the purchase or lease of real property
is protected only up to the time a contract or option to purchase or
lease is executed by the parties.'" Some states provide that labor
negotiations with public employees be conducted in closed sessions.
Arizona, for example, provides that "discussions or consultations
with representatives of employee organizations regarding the
salaries . . in order to review its position and instruct its
designated representatives" may be done in executive session.1' No
comparable provision exists in the Indiana Act.1"
128. For a general discussion of each of these major subjects permitted in ex-
ecutive sessions, see Tacha, 25 KAN. L. REV., supra note 38, at 195.
129. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11126 (Supp. 1979).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. ORE. REV. STAT. § 192.660(2)(c) (1978).
133. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-6(a)(ii) (Supp. 1979).
134. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.03(A)(4) (Supp. 1979).
135. The question of collective bargaining is not directly answered in the In-
diana act. The statute clearly provides strategy sessions with regard to collective
bargaining, but an effort in 1979 to have collective bargaining itself specifically exclud-
ed from protection under section 6 failed. However, the legislature added a new sec-
tion to the act providing that "any party may inform the public of the status of collec-
tive bargaining or discussion as it progresses by release of factual information and ex-
pression of opinion based upon factual information." It further provides that any
report filed by a mediator is to be public record and any hearings held by a factfinder
must be open to the public. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-6.5 (Supp. 1979).
The act doesn't answer whether collective bargaining sessions are
supposed to be open or not. We could not get through the legislature a
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NOTICE
Declaring a meeting open to the public means little if the
public is not informed that a meeting is scheduled. In 1962, however,
only six open meeting statutes contained provisions requiring public
notice: Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania
and Washington. The consequence, of course, is the defeat of the
statute by simple evasion. The governing body can merely meet at
times and places unknown to the public. If challenged, the body can
honestly respond that the meeting was open but that it is not the
body's responsibility to send invitations.
Since 1962, most states, including Indiana, have enacted notice
requirements.'87 Some of the statutes, however, require notice only
for "regular meetings," or only to those who request it.1" Some
statutes expressly require notice but provide only that
'adequate,"' or "reasonable,"" notice is necessary. Such language
is vague and lends itself to varying application. A closely related
problem is whether notice need be accompanied by an agenda. In a
number of situations, notice of a meeting without some indication of
the subject matter would be of little benefit to the public. Although
the press might be interested in attending every meeting of a gover-
ning body, members of the public are likely to be more selective. If
a statute is to truly serve the public's needs, some notice of agenda
as well as time, place and date should be required.
Unlike the various state provisions for executive sessions,
notice requirements vary widely. Some states require once-a-year
notice for regular meetings,"" while other states, like California, re-
quire that notice be given before every meeting."" For special or
bill requiring open collective bargaining. As it stands now, if the school
board itself does the bargaining then that has to be open. There are a
couple of court things to the contrary, [and the feeling among some
legislators is that the effect of making the boards bargain in public] is to
drive the school board away from the bargaining.
Cardwell Interview, Oct. 25, 1979.
136. Note, 75 HARV. L. REV., supra note 10, at 1207.
137. By 1974, only six states did not have notice requirements: Alabama,
Delaware, Georgia, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Utah.
138. See Tacha, 25 KAN. L. REV., supra note 38, at 190.
139. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4403 (Supp. 1979).
140. IOWA CODE ANN. § 28A.4 (Supp. 1979). In 1979, Iowa added to its statute a
definition of reasonable notice which includes notification of requesting news media
and posting of notice in a public place.
141. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 42.02(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.251(2) (Supp. 1979).
142. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54954 (Supp. 1979).
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emergency meetings, some states require 24-hour notice."8 Arkansas
and Texas require only two-hour notice. " The competing policy con-
cerns involved in establishing how much time is needed for notice to
be effective are clearly, on the one hand, the danger to public access
caused by "instant" meetings and, on the other hand, the govern-
mental interest in reacting quickly to an emergency or a deadline, for
example, a city's need to act promptly in order to obtain approval
for an expenditure by the state before the calender year expires.",
Most state statutes also direct the manner in which the public
is to be notified of a meeting. Arkansas requires notice of regular
meetings only to those requesting it. In the case of special or
emergency meetings, notice is given only to requesting news media
in the county in which the meeting is scheduled."' Other states re-
quire posting and publishing of notices for the general public in ad-
dition to media notification."7
It was against this background that Indiana drafted its notice
provisions for the Open Door Law. As in Illinois and Michigan, the
act provides that notice of regular meetings need be given only once
each year unless the date, time or place of the regular meeting is
changed. '8 However, an executive session, for purposes of the act, is
never considered a "regular" meeting and notice is required at each
occasion." ' In contrast with the Arkansas approach, which provides
notice to any person requesting it, the Indiana act requires only
posting at least 48 hours before the meeting a copy of the notice at
the office of the public agency or at the building where the meeting
is scheduled and delivery of a notice to news media which submit an
annual written request for notification."' One apparent weakness
with the Indiana procedure is that the act assumes the media will
request notices and then will publish them. However, whether by
oversight or intention, the media may do neither. The Arkansas ap-
proach at least allows interested citizens or citizen groups to re-
quest notification. Indiana's additional provision for posting notice at
143. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 42.02 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
144. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (1979 Replacement Vol.); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.
art. 6252-17 s 3(A)(b) (Supp. 1978).
145. See Blinn v. City of Marion, - Ind. App. -' 390 N.E.2d 1066 (1979).
146. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (1979 Replacement Vol.).
147. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, § 42.02 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
148. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-5(c) (Supp. 1979).
149. Id.
150. News media are defined as "all newspapers qualified to receive legal
advertisements under IC 5-3-1, all wire services and all licensed commercial or public
radio or television stations." IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-2(j) (Supp. 1979).
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the public agency's office or meeting place also is of little value to
those members of the public with infrequent access to the office or
meeting place. While no practical or inexpensive way exists to
notify every citizen of an impending meeting, a better approach, and
one more consistent with the burden on government to give notice,
might be simply to notify the media-whether requested or not-of
coming meetings, mail notices to citizens or citizen groups who have
specifically requested notification, and to continue posting notice at
the agency's office or meeting place.
When a meeting is called to deal with an emergency, Indiana
simply requires that those news media who have requested notice of
meetings must be given the same notice as ik given to the members
of the governing body and that notice be posted at the agency's of-
fice or meeting place."' The elimination of a specific time require-
ment prevents undue delay and is reasonable in a state where every
county seat has either a daily newspaper or a radio station. Again,
however, notice is limited to posting and to contacting news
organizations requesting notice.
Notice requirements have provided grounds for most of the
litigation in Indiana involving the Open Door Law. In the only case
so far to reach the appellate level, the court held that whether
notice was posted a full 48 hours in advance is an issue of material
fact and that a Marion mayor's affidavit that he gave "notice as re-
quired" is insufficient to serve as a basis for summary judgment.'52
In Muncie, injunction and declaratory relief are being sought
because an executive session was allegedly held without 48-hour
notice. 153 Similarly, in Manchester, where a school board allegedly ter-
minated a contract in executive session, patrons claim no notice was
given of the meeting." Finally, in Marion, county commissioners
have been challenged for allegedly meeting privately without notice
to discuss budget matters."s
151. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-5(d)(1)(2) (Supp. 1979).
152. Blinn v. City of Marion, __ Ind. App. - , 390 N.E.2d 1066 (1979).
153. Muncie Newspapers Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, No. 2S-78/1165
(Delaware Superior Court, filed Dec. 13, 1978). See note 79 supra.
154. Dziabis v. Manchester Community School Corporation, No. C-790224
(Kosciusko Circuit Court, filed May 22, 1979). Suit was brought by schbol patrons com-
plaining that the school board met secretly on April 23, 1979, and voted 4-3 to combine
the athletic director and assistant principal positions at Manchester High School. The
effect of the action was the termination of the athletic director's contract.
155. Federated Publications Inc. v. Grant County Council, No. St-79-387 (Grant
Superior Court, filed Sept. 12, 1979). Suit was brought by a newspaper complaining
that the county council met on Sunday, Aug. 26, 1979, in a secret session at a motel to
discuss the county budget.
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The notice requirement is in one sense the heart of the Open
Door Law. It is the clearest requirement, and the one that most
strongly serves the watchdog role of the press. It provides that for
whatever reasons governing bodies might choose to meet in ex-
ecutive sessions, they cannot avoid telling the public that they are
meeting nor can they avoid a challenge if their reasons conflict with
the law. The advance notice provision, which allows the news media
to keep track of closed meetings, is one of the principal reasons In-
diana editors cite as the reason for what they consider improved ac-
cess by the public to government meetings since 1977.150
REMEDIES
Not all states with open meeting laws provide penalties, but
those that do have made use of several enforcement devices: 1)
criminal penalties, 2) invalidation of decisions made at illegal, secret
meetings, 3) injunctions against future violations of the open
meeting law, 4) dismissal of violators from public office. 157 In addi-
tion, it has been noted that actions for assault and battery might be
brought where there is forcible ejectment and actions for false im-
prisonment if resistence leads to arrest." Indiana's Anti-Secrecy
Act of 1953 provided for criminal penalties of fine and imprison-
ment.159 When the act was revised as the Open Door Law in 1977,
the criminal sanctions were abandoned and replaced with a right to
seek injunctions to prevent planned illegal meetings and/or invalida-
tion of action taken during illegal meetings.'
156. Survey of Indiana editors (Fall, 1978) (unpublished results on file at the of-
fices of the Hoosier State Press Association, Indianapolis, Indiana).
157. The Arkansas statute formerly provided that public officials whose ap-
pointments must be confirmed by the senate are subject to dismissal for participating
in an improperly closed meeting. Ark. Acts 1949, No. 75 § 2.
158. Note, 75 HARV. L. REV., supra note 10, at 1215.
159. The Anti-Secrecy Act provided:
Any public official of the state, or of any political subdivision thereof, who
denies to any citizen the rights guaranteed to such citizen under the pro-
visions of section 3 and 4 of this chapter, and any public official who,
under the guise of participating in an executive session of the ad-
ministrative body or agency of which he is a member, attempts to defeat
the purposes of this chapter as set forth in section 1 hereof, shall be guil-
ty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not less
than fifty dollars ($50) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) to which
may be added imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed
thirty (30) days.
IND. CODE § 5-14-1-6(a) (1976).
160. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-7 (Supp. 1979).
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Indiana's experience with criminal penalties under the old
statute was typical of states using such a heavy club to force com-
pliance. The club was just too big and heavy to lift off the ground
so it was rarely, if ever, used. Even as late as 1975, one commen-
tator observed that no case had been found in any state where a
criminal penalty had been imposed.161 The reason seems to be clear
enough: Criminal enforcement depends on the action of prosecutors
who may understandably be reluctant to seek such an extreme
remedy for what might appear to be a minor violation of the law."2
Moreover, aside from the fact that violators are simply not pros-
ecuted, the criminal penalty does not necessarily accomplish the
legislative purpose, namely, to force public officials to allow the
public to view the decision-making process. The legislation should
not be intended to criminalize the conduct of public officials. 1" With
that kind of reasoning in mind, Indiana in 1977 switched to the use
of injunctions and declarations of invalidation as remedies aimed at
the meetings rather than the officials.
The new methods, too, have some defects, but they are at least
reasonably related to the purpose of opening meetings to the public.
The problem with invalidation is that it is available only when an il-
legal meeting results in the taking of some final action by the public
officials. It provides no remedy for illegal meetings involving only
discussion. Injunctions, since they operate prospectively, provide a
more satisfactory manner of enforcement, and the threat of con-
tempt proceedings is likely to be sufficient deterrent to future viola-
tions. However, a problem with the injunction in some states has
been the requirement that before an injunction can issue, there
must be a showing of prior illegal conduct.'" Moreover, injunctions
against a meeting are only effective when there is advance
knowledge that an illegal meeting is about to be held. Without such
a leak, the only prospective remedy is to seek an injunction to pre-
vent the carrying out of any decisions made or to seek invalidation
of the decisions. Nothing can be done about what was discussed.
Courts in many states have been reluctant to invalidate final
acts of governmental bodies.'65 Often invalidation does nothing more
161. See Note, Legislation: Oklahoma's Open Meeting Law, 29 OKLA. L. REV.
200 and n.105 (1976).
162. See Tacha, 25 KAN. L. REV., supra note 38, at 197.
163. Id. at 199.
164. See Comment, 53 J. URBAN L., supra note 125, at 542.
165. E.g. Wilmington Federation of Teachers v. Howell, 374 A.2d 832 (Del.
1977) (Invalidation of a public body's decision is a very serious sanction; absent specific
statutory provisions, courts are generally wary of imposing such a penalty for violation
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than to force a re-run public vote, especially where the secret vote
was unanimous. In addition, invalidation can cause tremendous prob-
lems for government when money has been spent, bonds issued or
contracts signed. The remedy might in some circumstances be far
worse than the disease."'
Indiana has attempted to resolve these difficulties by providing
that any citizen may seek an injunction or declaratory judgment but
if such action would invalidate any warrants, notes, bonds or obliga-
tions of the governing body, it must be brought before the delivery
of any of those warrants, notes, bonds or obligations."6 7 Moreover, if
relief is not sought within 30 days of the act or failure to act com-
plained of, no action can be brought."' As in so many other in-
stances, the act attempts to balance government's need to operate
smoothly with the public's right to observe and attend meetings.
Government cannot operate if its actions are clouded months or
years later by suits for declarations of invalidity. The public, on the
other hand, should not be able to use open meeting statutes to
harass and confuse government. The solution has been an extremely
short statute of limitations giving citizens a right to act, but only if
they act quickly."6 9 The approach is reasonable. The major problem,
of course, is that it provides yet another method whereby a careful
governmental agency with tight security and loyal members could
evade the statute. Such evasion, however, seems more theoretical
than real. Where the press and public remain vigorous and atten-
tive, it would be rare that a clandestine meeting where official ac-
tion was taken would go unnoticed for more than a month.
In 1979, Indiana added some extra teeth to the act by pro-
viding that the court may award reasonable attorney fees, court
costs and other expenses of litigation to the prevailing party if the
plaintiff prevails and the defendant's violation was knowing or inten-
tional or if the defendant prevails and the court finds the action was
frivolous and vexatious. 70 Criminal penalties have been abandoned
in Indiana as harsh and unrealistic. In their place are civil actions
of acts.); Kane v. County Board of School Trustees, 60 Ill. App. 3d 415, 376 N.E.2d 1054
(1978) (Act does not mandate invalidity of public actions allegedly taken during closed
proceedings.); Dobrovolny v. Reinhart, 173 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1970) (Statute could not
be reasonably interpreted as providing that violations thereof rendered the actions of
a public body void).
166. See Note, 75 HARV. L. REV., supra note 10, at 1213.
167. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-7(b) (Supp. 1979).
168. Id.
169. IND. CODE § 5-14-1.5-7(c) (Supp. 1979).
170. Id.
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accessible to any citizen whereby a secret meeting falling within
the scope of the act might be enjoined or illegal decisions declared
void. As with any statute designed to open government, however,
the value of the remedies and penalties is their effectiveness as an
incentive for compliance rather than as an antidote to decisions
made behind closed doors.
CONCLUSION
Indiana's Open Door Law was drafted and passed in the wake
of a general revival of interest in access to government. The
legislators had the advantage of being able to compare a wide range
of already enacted legislation and some commentary by legal
scholars. In this uniquely advantageous position, the state
legislature chose to tailor a statute that is at once a remarkably
liberal departure from the informal past patterns of Hoosier govern-
ment and a remarkably conservative preservation of Hoosier politics
as usual.
The people of Indiana have been provided with an important
right of access to the meetings of public bodies, a right not ac-
corded by common law or apparently by the Constitution. For that
reason the act is primarily effective as a policy directive to public
officials and to private citizens seeking admission to governmental
meetings. The statute clearly affirms Indiana's position supporting
open government and describes the parameters of that position.
The great advantage of the law is that it keeps the formal processes
of government open and provides a means whereby citizens can
challenge evasion quickly.
However, the right of access is rendered substantially less
meaningful by the continued protection of the private political
caucus with its attendant potential for abuse. While the caucus may
have been a legitimate trade off to assure passage of the act and to
preserve a long-standing tradition in the state legislature, it is cer-
tainly of less value at the local level where it provides a handy
means for making decisions about public business under the cover of
partisan political activity. This is particularly true where the only
party members attending the caucus consist of a majority of the city
council.
The act places the responsibility for openness on government
officials and directs the courts to liberally construe its parameters.
Nevertheless, abuse, evasion and overreaching are clearly possible,
and open government will remain a distant goal until it becomes a
part of the day-to-day policy of decision makers. No single act can
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completely supplant the tradition of secret meetings or overcome
the difficulty of detecting such meetings. Open government requires
a fundamental change in the attitude of public officials regarding
freedom of information. The real value of Indiana's act is its en-
couragement of openness. Whatever opportunities for secrecy that
might still be available are of no consequence if officials believe in
and practice open government. The Open Door Law is important
because it reflects such an attitude by the state's most visible
leadership.
Jon Dilts
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